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Abstract
Beginning in the 1980’s over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives began trading in
large amounts. Their trading volume grew rapidly, to a total notional value of $88.2tn by
the end of 1999; their gross market value was about $2.8tn.1 However, since such large
amounts of money are at stake in the OTC derivatives market, gaps in the regulatory
framework and standards have the potential to cause large financial losses, which have
that ability to undermine confidence in the financial system. As a result, there has been an
ongoing debate in the United States about the proper role for regulation in the market for
derivatives. In order to properly asses a regulatory approach, legislators and market
participants must have thorough knowledge in derivatives and understand the market
effectively. The derivatives market is vast with different derivative instruments that are
traded on exchanges and over OTC markets. The large amounts of derivatives trading,
and their potential threat to the stability of the global financial system, needs to be
monitored by an effective regulatory framework that promotes growth and innovation
and prevents risks and market failures. The successful role of the private sector in
creating standardization and stability within the OTC derivatives market suggests that
this type of framework could be successful in monitoring the market.

1
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INTRODUCTION
Derivates are “financial contracts whose value is linked to the price of an
underlying commodity, asset, rate, index or the occurrence or magnitude of an event.”2
These instruments can be used for hedging, speculating, arbitraging price differences, and
adjusting portfolios. Derivatives allow end-users the ability to manage their risks
associated with holding increasingly larger portfolios of diverse financial assets because
there is no underlying ownership of assets.3
Derivatives include different financial instruments such as futures, forwards,
options and swaps. They are categorized according to whether they are standardized or
customized to meet specific end users' needs. Standardized derivatives are traded through
organized exchanges and called exchange-traded derivatives.4 These types of derivatives
involve “varying degrees of order exposure, trade transparency, audit trails,
clearinghouses and other attributes.”5 Derivatives can also be traded in over-the-counter
markets (OTC). These OTC derivatives are privately negotiated by the parties involved.
The developers and traders of OTC derivatives are large banks and securities firms, and
the end-users are financial institutions, corporations, and some high net worth
individuals.6
Derivatives vary in size, duration, complexity and purpose. Some are referred to
as "plain vanilla" instruments, such as simple currency swaps.7 Others are highly

2
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Randall Dodd, “The Structure of OTC Derivatives Markets,” The Financier 9 (2002): 41.
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complicated allocations of cash flows, and can span periods of 20 years or more. Some
complex derivatives are attached to or imbedded in other financial instruments.
In June 2005, the gross market value of outstanding OTC derivatives was
$10.7 trillion, as measured by the Bank of International Settlements, a Switzerland-based
clearinghouse for central banks.8 This represented an 83% increase from the year before.
Also, the notional amount from these derivatives “jumped to $270.1 trillion, nearly 23%
ahead of the prior year” and another $57.8 trillion came from “exchange listed futures
and options [transactions]…a 24% jump from the year earlier.”9 The continuously
growing derivative market has the potential to generate a lot of profit and risk.
Economists and government regulators are concerned about the future development of
this market and are interested in creating a proper regulatory approach that will be able to
react to changes and prevent market failures. One solution to the regulatory debate is the
reliance on the private sector to monitor and oversee the market. Private regulation
through standard setting agencies and policy groups is successful in responding to
changes within derivative markets and in creating standardization. Greater choice and
flexibility is important for users of derivatives and such an environment is fostered under
private legislation. In comparison to public regulation of derivatives, which stifles
innovation and growth, and complete deregulation, which doesn’t protect against risks,
oversight by the private sector is a successful tool for monitoring OTC markets.
Derivatives Market
The overall market in derivative instruments, particularly OTC derivatives, has
grown enormously in recent years and continues to do so. Derivatives are useful

8
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Ben Mattlin, “Derived Value,” Global Finance 20.6 (2000): 33.
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structures that provide a lot of benefits to market participants. Besides that large profits
that can be made, derivative transactions pay out when certain events occur, such as when
an underlying stock reaches a particular price. Derivatives can be structured in many
different ways and are therefore a way of transferring market risk.10
The derivatives market does not create risk but instead shifts risk that already
exists. Whether derivatives enhance a company's safety or increase its risks depends on
how the instruments are used, and on what happens in the market during the term of the
contract.11 By allowing a corporation to control its financial risk exposure, derivatives
help many companies operate more efficiently and safely. Hedging some market risk can
be an inexpensive way to enhance long-term shareholder values.12 However, derivatives
can be used in a manner that increases risks for an end-user. Companies need to pay more
attention to internal corporate practices by their management and board members to make
sure that risks are not being increased through unwise derivatives usage.13 Directors and
managers have a responsibility to know and control the degree to which the shareholders'
net worth is being put at risk. Many corporations lack the systems for risk modeling and
control. One way to reduce the risk of exposure to derivatives is to understand the
background and function of these products.
What are Credit Derivatives?
Credit derivatives have revolutionized the way in which banks and other financial
institutions manage their credit risk.14 A credit derivative is a type of derivative that is
designed to transfer credit risk from the person exposed to that risk, a protection buyer, to
10

Mattlin 33.
Richard C. Breeden, “Regulating the derivatives market,” Corporate Board 15.88 (1994): 1.
12
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Matthews and Rusinko 339.
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Antulio N. Bomfim, "Understanding Credit Derivatives and their Potential to Synthesize Riskless Assets,"
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2001):50.
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a person willing to take on that risk, a protection seller.15 A credit derivative derives its
price from the credit quality of a bond, loan, or group of financial obligations of an
underlying reference entity.
Credit risk is the risk that the borrower of a loan or the issuer of securities will
default in the performance of its obligations or become insolvent.16 Credit derivatives can
be used to reduce a lender’s or investor’s exposure to the default or insolvency of
borrowers and issuers. As Ali and Robbe explain, “in contrast to traditional methods of
credit risk management, credit derivatives disaggregate the credit risk from loans and
securities, thus enabling lenders and investors to transfer the credit risk independently
while retaining the economic benefit of their loans and investments.”17
A market participant who is exposed to the credit risk of a given corporation can
hedge such an exposure by buying protection in the credit derivatives market.18 There are
many types of credit derivatives products with their own legal form and specific risk
profile. These instruments can be OTC transactions as well as exchange traded products.
OTC transactions are bilateral contracts designed to meet the specific requirements of the
parties. Their main benefit, compared to exchange traded transactions, is flexibility.
There are four common types of credit derivatives: credit default swaps, asset swap, total
return swaps, and credit linked notes.
The most common credit derivative is a credit default swap. A credit default swap
(CDS) is similar to an insurance policy. One counterparty sells insurance and the other
counterparty buys insurance against the default of the third party. A protection buyer
15

Breeden 3.
Bomfim 52.
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Paul U. Ali and Jan Job de Vries Robbe, “New Frontiers in Credit Derivatives,” Journal of Banking
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purchases protection against default risk of assets. The protection buyer pays a periodic
fee, and receives payment from the protection seller in the event of a default.19 If a
default occurs, the buyer of the insurance has the right to sell the bonds or other assets
issued by the company for their face value, and the seller of the insurance agrees to buy
the bonds for their face value.20 The buyer of the CDS makes periodic payments to the
seller until the end of the life of the CDS or until a default occurs.
An example of a credit default swap can be when two counterparties, counterparty
A and an investor, enter into a two-year credit default swap. They specify a reference
asset, which is a credit risky bond issued by a third-party corporation. This bond has two
years remaining maturity and is trading at par value. Counterparty A agrees to make
regular fixed payments for two years to the investor. If the third party defaults within
those two years, counterparty A makes his regular fixed payment to the investor and sells
the bond to the investor in exchange for the bond’s par value plus interest.
Moorad Choudhry and Frank J. Fabozzi state that “credit default swaps are
important and useful because the absence of ownership and the economic risk of the
underlying assets provide significant additional flexibility in bank balance sheet
management, as well as for hedging and arbitrage transactions.”21 The value of this
flexibility can be seen in the growth of the credit derivatives market.
In the event of default, CDSs can be settled physically or in cash, with the
settlement choice determined when entering the contract. In a physically settled swap, the

19

Douglas Lucas, Laurie Goodman, and Frank J. Fabozzi, “A Closer Look at Default
Rates on Structured Finance Securities.” Journal of Fixed Income 14.2 (2004): 46.
20
Lucas, Goodman, and Fabozzi 46.
21
Moorad Choudhry and Frank J. Fabozzi, “Originating Collateralized Debt Obligations
for Balance Sheet Management,” Journal of Structured and Project Finance (2003): 41.
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protection buyer has the right to sell the defaulted assets to the protection seller for their
face value. In a cash settled swap, the counterparty determines the recovery value of the
defaulted assets, and the protection seller is responsible for the difference between face
and recovery values. These transactions are based on standardized contracts incorporating
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) standard definitions.
Standardization of documentation helps create liquidity in the credit risk that is being
traded.22 The use of master agreements by the ISDA is now a common market practice,
reducing legal risk and setup and negotiation costs. However, some ambiguity still exists
in the standardized documentation as to what constitutes the legal definition of a default
event.
An asset swap is another example of a credit derivative. Asset swaps allow
investors to take credit positions regarding a particular issuer. In an asset swap, an
investor can buy a fixed-rate liability issued by a reference entity and simultaneously
enter an interest rate swap where the fixed-rate and payment dates exactly match those of
the fixed-rate liability.23 The floating rate in such a swap is the spread over short-term
LIBOR. The end result of an asset swap is “a synthetic floating-rate liability issued by the
reference entity, which means that the investor transferred the interest rate risk of the
fixed-rate liability to its asset swap counterparty, retaining only the credit risk
component.”24
Another type of credit derivatives is a total return swap. In a total return swap, an
investor enters into a derivatives contract where he will receive all the cash flows

22

Breeden 8.
Bomfim 59.
24
Bomfim 59.
23

Litvinova 9
associated with a given reference asset without ever owning the asset.25 In exchange for
cash flows, the investor makes periodic payments to its derivatives counterparty. If the
issuer of the reference asset defaults during the term of the total return swap, the investor
sustains the associated loss. At maturity of the total return swap, the total return payer
pays the difference between the price of the reference asset and its price at the start date
of the contract.
Credit-linked notes (CLNs) are debt obligations with an embedded credit
derivative. They can be issued either directly by bank or by highly rated special purpose
vehicles created by dealers. The coupon payments made by CLNs transfers the cash flow
of a credit derivatives contract to individual investors. 26
The credit derivatives market that has grown in recent years is small compared to
the overall derivatives market, and it has not yet reached the liquidity, transparency,
standardization, and widespread market participation of more mature markets.27 The
credit derivatives market’s prospect of continued growth, greater standardization of
market practices, and improvements in counterparty credit risk, point to their significant
benefits for financial markets in the future. In addition to efficiency gains in the pricing
and distribution of credit risk, the credit derivatives market may eventually become
sufficiently developed to allow for the large scale creation of synthetic assets that are free
from default risk.28
TRADING ENVIRONMENTS
Exchange Markets

25
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In an exchange market, trading is conducted through open outcry and carried out
through brokers and not dealers. Because of recent advances in technology, exchanges
began using electronic trading platforms that automatically match the bids and offers
from market participants to execute trades in a multilateral environment.29
One of the main features of derivatives traded by exchanges is standardization.
Standardization makes sure that every contract is the same in terms of what, how much,
when, and where a commodity is to be delivered. It is also an important feature because it
allows a trader, for example, who has sold a contract to deliver a stock, to get out of the
market by buying a contract to deliver that stock. If he sells the stock for more than he
bought it, he profits. Otherwise he loses money.
In addition, exchanges also offer a trading platform and a clearing system. The
trading platform is the mechanism by which buyers and sellers are brought together and
orders are matched.30 The difference between open outcry and electronic trading is the
method by which trades are matched. In open outcry, trades are matched by the ability of
traders on the floor to locate other traders who have an opposite trading interest. In
electronic trading, a computer takes the place of traders and matches bids and offers on
the other side of the market.
Clearinghouses also play a role in exchanges by becoming the buyer to each seller
and the seller to each buyer of every futures and options contract traded on the
exchange.31 The clearinghouse is usually a division of a commodity exchange. Once a
trade has occurred on the exchange floor or electronic trading system, the information
29

Dodd 43.
Gregory Kuserk et al., “Derivatives and Risk Management in the Petroleum, Natural Gas, and Electricity
Industries,” Energy Information Administration October 2002, 3 December 2206
< http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/derivative/index.html>.
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Kuserk et al.
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from the trade is sent to the clearinghouse for confirmation.32 The clearinghouse checks
that the information provided by the two parties matches exactly. If it does, the
clearinghouse takes the opposite side of each counterparty that entered into the trade on
the exchange.
The main purpose of a clearinghouse is to create liquidity by taking the other side
of each contract, which makes it easy for parties to enter and exit contracts.33 Without
this structure, counterparties would have had to negotiate with the original counterparty
any early terminations of the contracts or would have needed to ask permission to
substitute a different party to take on the contract.34 Since the clearinghouse gets rid of
these concerns, counterparties on exchanges can freely enter and exit the market.
Over-the-Counter Markets
The OTC markets are organized different from exchange markets. There are three
types of markets: a traditional dealer market, an electronically brokered market, and a
proprietary trading platform market.35 The OTC markets are organized around one or
more dealers who "make a market" by maintaining bid and offer quotes to market
participants.36 In this type of market, the end users of derivatives look for companies that
create customized contracts to fit their needs. The dealers then offset the risk of the
contracts by entering into exchange-traded futures and option contracts or other OTC
derivative contracts that have an opposite risk profile.37 The dealer market is made up of
mostly large investment banks and some commercial banks. However, as the market has

32

Kuserk et al.
Kuserk et al.
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Kuserk et al.
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matured, specialized companies have moved into niches where they may have an
informational or operational advantage over the banks.
In OTC markets, counterparties are able to negotiate on contract terms such as the
price, maturity, and size of the contract in order to customize the contract to meet their
economic needs. Also, because OTC contracts are entered into on a principal-to-principal
basis, each counterparty is exposed to the credit risk of the opposite party. The
negotiation of execution prices are generally conducted over the telephone or through the
use of electronic bulletin boards by the dealers for posting their quotes.38
New technologies have been adapted to create an electronic brokering platform
that allows for a multilateral trading environment.39 In an OTC market organized through
an electronic brokering platform, the firm operating the platform acts only as a broker
and does not take a position through the system. However, if the electronic brokering
platform uses a clearinghouse then it can act as a counterparty and takes on positions.
This occurs because the clearinghouse assumes all the credit risk of trades that are made
through the electronic brokering platform and reported to the clearinghouse.40
Another type of trading environment is a derivatives dealer who sets up his own
proprietary electronic trading platform. In this arrangement, the bids and offers are posted
exclusively by the dealer and other market participants observe these quotes. This is a
one-way multilateral environment because only the dealer's quotes are seen. Because the
dealer is the counterparty to every trade, the dealer assumes the credit risk in the market.
According to the Commodity Exchange Act, this type of trading environment is not

38
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considered a trading facility because “the bids and offers can not be posted by all the
participants and thus not all participants can trade within this system.”41
OTC derivatives and exchange-traded futures can be used as substitutes for each
other because they serve similar economic functions and may compete in the
marketplace. They are not perfect substitutes because of differences in their contract
terms, transaction costs, regulations, and other factors. OTC derivatives and exchangetraded futures can also complement each other. For example, swaps dealers use
exchange-traded futures to hedge the residual risk from unmatched positions in their
swaps portfolios.42 Similarly, commercial firms can use exchange-traded futures to hedge
their forward positions.
Contracts traded on exchanges offer high liquidity and low credit risk, but are
standardized and inflexible, causing users to face large basis risk when hedging. Dodd
explains that “by being able to negotiate contract terms, users can reduce basis risk by
assuring that the terms of derivative contracts more closely match the characteristics of
their physical market positions; however, the advantage of customization generally
comes at the expense of liquidity and credit assurances.”43 There are advantages and
disadvantages to both types of markets for derivatives trading.
CURRENT DERIVATIVES REGULATION IN THE US
Regulation of Exchange-Traded Derivatives
The regulation of derivative trading in the United States depends on whether
trading is done on an exchange and whether the trader is a bank, an insurance company,
or another regulated entity. Regulation of the futures and options markets is
41
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accomplished through self-regulation by the exchanges and oversight by the Federal
Government through the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).44 In the
legislation establishing the CFTC, Kuserk et al. explains that Congress sought to assure
orderly futures markets, operating fairly, with prices free of distortion.45
The CFTC oversees the enforcement of exchange rules and conducts its own
surveillance of trading in futures and related cash markets as part of its mission to prevent
market abuse and to enhance market operations). The Commission oversees the
regulations and rules of the futures exchanges and requires exchanges to enforce them.
The CFTC also relies on its economists and trading experts to monitor contracts and
trading in the public interest, to assure that markets provide a means for managing and
assuming price risks, discovering prices, or distributing pricing information through
trading in liquid, fair, and financially secure trading facilities.46
In addition to regulation by the Federal Government, futures trading is overseen
by the National Futures Association (NFA), a “registered futures association” under the
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) that has been authorized by the Commission to register
all categories of persons and firms dealing with customers.47 Before registering a new
person or firm, the NFA conducts a thorough background check of the applicant to
determine whether they should be allowed to conduct commodity business.
Commodity exchanges follow Federal regulation along with their own rules for the
conduct of their markets. These rules can include: covering clearance of trades, trade
orders and records, position limits, price limits, disciplinary actions, floor trading

44
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practices, and standards of business conduct.48 A new or amended exchange rule must be
reported to the CFTC, which may also direct an exchange to change its rules and
practices.
Under the CEA, trading of futures and options on CFTC-approved exchanges is
the exclusive form of permissible trading, without a specific exemption or exclusion. The
CFTC, in 1993, granted several exemptions for OTC derivative contracts. The first
exemptions were granted for swaps and other OTC derivative contracts and for hybrid
instruments.49 While the CFTC and the exemptions created under it allowed the OTC
markets in derivatives to continue to develop, it did not address whether or not any
particular type of transaction, such as a swap agreement, is a futures or an option.50 As a
result of this omission concerns about legal uncertainty remain.
On December 21, 2000, Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization
Act of 2000 (CFMA), excluding hybrid instruments, swap transactions, transactions in
exempt commodities, and the exemption for commercial markets.51 Each of these
exemptions and exclusions are determined by issuers of the contracts, depending on the
nature of the counterparties and the means by which the contracts are entered into.
The guidelines for OTC derivatives that are exempt from CFTC regulation are based on
the party that is offering or entering into the contract. The contract or transaction itself,
however, is not regulated. Also, the SEC has the authority only to regulate the activities
of broker-dealers. These firms are required to register with the SEC and comply with its

48
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requirements for regulatory reporting, minimum capital, and examination. However, U.S.
securities laws do not apply to a broker-dealer’s entire organizational structure, which
may also include a holding company and other affiliates.52 The SEC has limited
authority, because its jurisdiction extends only to to the activity of broker-dealers that
engage in both securities and derivatives activities.
Regulation of OTC Derivatives
Current regulation of the OTC derivatives market consists of government
regulators and non-government regulators. Non-government regulators include industry
standards setting organizations like the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA), and the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group (CRMPG).53. In the
financial sector, government regulators include the Federal Reserve (Fed), the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Commodities and Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC). Although, the OTC derivatives market is not directly regulated by
government agencies, the primary participants like large banks and securities firms, are
directly regulated. Therefore, they have an obligation to make sure banks and securities
firms are operating in a safe environment.
Regulation of Derivate Markets
Public Regulation

Private Regulation

The Federal Reserve

ISDA

The SEC

Group of Thirty

The CFTC

Derivative Policy Group

The NFA

DPC
Counterparty Risk Management Group
FASB
Credit Rating Agencies

52
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Industry setters like ISDA and CRMPG, play a significant role in derivatives
regulation. These groups evolved as a result of gaps in OTC standards and regulation, and
from complaints by end users. Matthews and Rusinko agree that “a feature of the OTC
derivatives market is its lack of formal regulators and almost total reliance on these
industry standard setters.”54 However, these standard-setting organizations alone are not
always adequate to solve all problems that arise in the OTC derivatives market. For
example, one of the most recent problems is the excessive leverage and lack of
transparency, and can occur in the collapse of a hedge fund.55 Such a collapse and loss
could pose a threat to the international financial system.
The OTC derivatives market includes a large variety of transactions and
customized products, which lack the unifying characteristics of conventional markets.
The market exists to meet the needs of customers who are interested in particular
commodities that are not available on exchanges. The variety of OTC contracts reflects
the variety of individual situations, and unlike the market for exchange contracts the OTC
market tends to adapt and change quickly.56 In addition, the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000 established a number of exemptions and exclusions that apply
to a variety of transactions and contracts involving various counterparties, commodities,
and trading arrangements.57
Growth of Private Oversight

54
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Trading on exchanges has been facing increasing competition from the OTC
markets. In order to sustain the rapid growth of OTC derivative markets, market
participants have developed innovative ways to try to reproduce the benefits of
exchanges, but at lower costs and in a decentralized way.58 The recent trend has been
toward increased privatization of derivatives regulation, with trading volumes shifting
from exchanges to OTC transactions. Private regulators have grown in strength through
the acquisition of policy-making functions and legitimacy, and through economic
strength.59 Industry self-regulation and market-based supervision are widely accepted.
This is significant because by influencing standards and practices, the private for profit
sector is affecting public policy as well.60
Competition exists in OTC markets among public regulators and private
regulators.61 By choosing where and how to structure a contract, participants weigh the
costs and benefits of different regulatory and legal enforcement systems. Various types of
public and private regulation produce the benefit of confidence and stability in financial
institutions and markets. As a result, the private sector has a large demand for regulation
and enforcement.
An important factor behind the growth of the OTC markets has been the
development of private standard-setting bodies, like the International Swap and
Derivatives Association (ISDA).62 This organization has developed a master agreement

58

Randall S. Kroszner, “The Supply of and Demand for Financial Regulation: Public and Private
Competition Around the Globe,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium on Global Economic
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which provides standard definitions of terms used in OTC derivatives and guidelines for
the formulation of contracts.63 Contracting parties in these markets agree to follow the
definitions even though the contracts are individually-tailored. In this way,
standardization is achieved but specific contracts can be more flexible than those traded
on an exchange.
Another form of private regulatory structure is an “innovative firm structure,”
which has played a significant role in the evolution of the OTC markets. The Derivatives
Product Company (DPC) was invented so that participants in the OTC markets can limit
counterparty risk.64 DPCs are separately capitalized special purpose vehicles with high
credit ratings. Their purpose is to ensure that banks with a relatively low rating can still
take part in the OTC market through these special purpose vehicles.65
In the OTC markets, the rating agencies have an important certification role.
These rating agencies are not guarantors like a clearinghouse, but instead they are
effective regulators in setting standards for capital, collateral, and conduct, like
clearinghouses and government regulators, but do not have a direct financial stake in the
transactions.
Additionally other organizations and agencies play a role in regulating and
monitoring derivative markets. One such organization is The Group of Thirty, which was
formed in 1978. It is an international association of bankers and former government
officials which develops supervisory practices and capital requirements for banks.66 In

63
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July 1993, the Group published ‘Derivatives: Principles and Practices’. The study was the
first comprehensive effort to explain what the industry has learned and to broaden
awareness of the more successful management practices.67 It provided 20
recommendations for both dealers and end users. Some of the recommendations reflected
practices that were already in widespread use, others represented choices between
alternative practices, while still others represented emerging practices followed by some
participants.
The Derivatives Policy Group was organized in 1994 by the leading investment
banks on Wall Street to respond to the public policy issues raised by the OTC derivatives
activities of unregulated affiliates of SEC registered broker dealers and the CFTC’s
registered futures commission merchants.68 The group worked with the SEC and the
CFTC to issue a report in March 1995, to establish a framework for voluntary oversight
of the OTC derivatives activities of securities firms. The framework consisted of four
interrelated components: management controls; enhanced reporting; evaluation of risk in
relation to capital; and counterparty relationships
The Counterparty Risk Management Group was established in 1998 by a group of
12 major commercial banks to address issues related to the near collapse of the Long
Term Capital Management hedge fund. The firm’s derivatives strategies played an
important role in the firm’s difficulties. The group provided recommendations to promote
strong practices in counterparty credit and market risk management.69 The objectives of
the group were endorsed by the Federal Reserve, the SEC and the Treasury Department.
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The groups’ recommendations were a response to market disruptions and provided
improvements in market-wide practices and conventions in a collective manner.70
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is a private sector
organization which functions as the accounting standard-setting organization. The SEC
has formal oversight responsibilities for the FASB and consults closely with the FASB in
the accounting standards-setting process.71 In 1998, the FASB issued Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (SFAS 133), “Accounting for Derivatives
Instruments and Hedging Activities”. Statement 133 requires that parties report all of
their derivatives as either assets or liabilities in financial statements and measure those
instruments at their fair market value.72 The statement requires that any change in the fair
value of derivatives be reported in the earnings in the period charged.
Formation of ISDA
Historically, derivatives markets have been subject to the same types of public
regulation as securities markets. However, there has been a shift in recent years from
derivatives transactions subject to public regulation to those subject to private
regulation.73 The OTC derivatives markets are dominated by private legal rules, specified
in one or more form documents incorporated into derivatives contracts. The most
common source of private regulation is the documentation of transactions by ISDA.74
ISDA is a global trade association representing the leading market participants in the
OTC derivatives industry.
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Founded in 1985, ISDA was initially set up to help the young industry establish a
legal groundwork for over-the-counter swaps. ISDA's early initiatives were limited to
creating the legal backdrop necessary for the swaps business.75 Later on, ISDA created
the master trust agreement for swaps that is still in use today; it also pushed for laws to
protect the practice of netting in case of bankruptcy.76 ISDA has produced several
generations of standardized language and master forms used by most market participants.
ISDA has continually revised its forms to reflect changing products, market practices,
and laws. Although ISDA is a trade association, not an independent research institution, it
has performed a valuable social function by increasing each market participant's
understanding of legal risks.77 ISDA has also gone further by actually reducing risks. The
agency was the major force behind explicit international acceptance of netting. Hu
explains that “netting occurs when two parties who have entered into multiple derivative
transactions with each other aggregate all such transactions in the event of bankruptcy,
thereby reducing credit risk.”78 ISDA obtained legal opinions on the netting issue from
lawyers in most industrialized nations, drafted contractual provisions applying netting,
and facilitated consistent statutory changes.
The central document used by most derivatives market participants is the ISDA
Master Agreement (the current version is the amended 2002 ISDA Master Agreement).
ISDA created this form document in 1987 and over time has added provisions and
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created supporting documents.79 The ISDA Master Agreement is singed before any
parties enter into any derivatives transactions. These documents specify the obligations
and representations of each party, and the relevant events of default and termination.80
They also define the market conventions to be followed in derivatives transactions. Then,
once the Master Agreement is executed, parties enter into derivatives transactions after
reaching an oral agreement based on a written term sheet. After this agreement, the
parties sign a confirmation of the terms of the specific transaction. This confirmation,
together with the ISDA Master Agreement and Schedule, form the body of private law
governing the derivatives transaction.81 These form documents have adjusted rapidly to
reflect changes in practices among market participants, and ISDA quickly has developed
form documents to be used with new transactions. For example, in 2002 ISDA published
a list of credit derivatives definitions, including a detailed description of six credit events,
a draft confirmation, and commentary.
ISDA’s definitions and subsequent supplements “have been drafted through
inclusive consultation of market participants including dealers and end users.”82 These
definitions have helped shape the market. Additionally, the Master Agreement and
definitions can be incorporated into confirmations relating to derivatives. This allows
parties to a transaction to use a short form confirmation containing only economic and
deal-specific terms relating to that transaction, while the standard terms in the Master or
definitions remain unchanged.83 The purpose of this type of structure is to provide market
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participants with a documentation tool that is able to deal with issues occurring from
derivative transactions, efficiently and cost-effectively. All ISDA documentation allows
parties to add different elections and to make amendment or additions in the
confirmation. The definitions also provide for fallbacks which apply in cases where
parties did not otherwise specify something. An example would be of election elements,
such as minimum amounts of payment required to a failure by the reference entity to
make a payment for its obligations.84
Derivatives Product Company
Another structure that represents the growth of private regulation is the innovative
firm structure. Clearinghouses have been successful in managing and controlling risk for
exchange-based trading, however, they have been facing increasing competition from the
growth of the OTC market. The benefits of derivatives traded on exchanges are the cost
of standardizing contracts to make them more liquid; however recent advances in
financial theory and technology have changed this trade-off from the OTC market.85
Innovations in risk management have increased the ability to monitor credit risk of
counterparties and have enhanced the roles or rating agencies to monitor credit quality.
Also, new techniques have increased demand for tailored products for hedging firmspecific risk and have allowed for the creation of new sophisticated products.86
These forces have led to a rise of a new type of organization, the derivatives
product company (DPC). This structure has been developed to provide the benefits of an
exchange-clearing system while preserving the flexibility and decentralization of the
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OTC market.87 Credit agencies play an important certification role as third-party monitors
in OTC markets. The rating agencies are not guarantors like clearinghouses. Rating
agencies are important for setting standard for capital, collateral, and conduct without
having a financial stake in the transactions. Because of a large number of bankruptcies in
the OTC market in the late 1980’s and 1990’s, there was increased concern about credit
risk.88 As a result, market participants worked with credit rating agencies to develop a
new vehicle to address credit risks. The DPC was created to get a high credit rating while
minimizing the amount of capital that is contributed by a sponsor or parent firm.
Kroszner explains that Moody’s believes a way to structure a DPC is by a “reliance on
mirrored transactions to eliminate market risk by pass[ing] it back to the sponsor.”89
Rating agencies give a large degree of flexibility to market participants to develop
methods for fulfilling the requirements for a high credit rating.
A DPC’s structure involves hedging their market risk, monitoring and measuring
credit risk, and prepackaging and privatizing bankruptcy procedures to reduce uncertainty
about how counterparties will be affected if the first two procedures fail.90 The credit
agencies and greater sophistication of risk assessment models have set standards and
encouraged innovations to reduce costs and the likelihood of failure in the OTC market.
The DPC’s and the innovations supporting growth of the OTC market have provided an
important source of competition for the exchanges and demonstrate the role of private
regulation in its ability to set standards and provide progress.
Public Regulation
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In contrast to private rules, legal rules generated by public entities have a much
different past. Culp and Mackay explain that “financial regulation in the United States
comes in two varieties: institutional and functional.”91 Institutional regulation is
regulation of the different kinds of enterprises involved in financial markets and
intermediation. Functional regulation is regulation of financial instruments and markets
according to the underlying economic function they perform. Derivative transactions are
regulated within this framework and since they involve many types of institutions and
functions, derivatives regulation can be complex. The SEC and the CFTC are viewed as
"functional regulators," because they dedicate most of their resources to regulating
products and markets rather than the users of those products and markets.92
Securities Exchange Commission
Securities trading in the US is regulated by an independent federal authority - the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Established in 1934 in the aftermath of
October 1929 financial crisis, the SEC was the first federal agency devoted to the
regulation of financial markets.93 The SEC regulates the issuance of securities brokerdealers and the trading of outstanding securities under the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934.94 Also, because of the SEC's asset by asset approach, there is no offset for hedges.
Under this regulation, it is prohibitive for SEC registered broker-dealers to do a
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derivatives business, and firms have had to establish subsidiaries outside of SEC
jurisdiction95
In December, 1997 the SEC proposed to bring unregulated subsidiaries under a
modified regulation called broker-dealer-lite.96 The modified regulations were available
for OTC derivative subsidiaries that deal only with large institutional counterparties. The
broker-lite proposal has also produced some confrontation from the CFTC, who thinks
that they should be regulating these derivatives subsidiaries. Stoll explains that “a
focused approach to SEC capital regulation would require the portion of the broker dealer
holding insured customer accounts to have solid collateral and to be transparent.”97 The
remainder of the broker dealers would be unregulated or subject to broker-dealer “lite”
regulation.
The SEC regulates all securities traded on national securities exchanges. Several
exchange-traded derivatives fall under the legal classification of securities, including
currency options, stock options, and options on stock indexes. The SEC’s regulation of
these products and exchanges include transparency and price reporting requirements,
anti-manipulation regulations, position limits, audit trail requirements, and margin
requirements.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) was formed with the

passage of the Commodity Futures Trading Act by Congress in 1974. This Act extended
regulation to all futures trading and created a federal regulatory agency, CFTC, for
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commodities trading that was similar to the SEC.98 The CFTC has jurisdiction over all
commodity futures contracts, including options and futures. Its functional regulations
include minimum capital requirements, reporting and transparency requirements, antifraud and anti-manipulation regulations, and minimum standards for clearinghouse
organizations.99 Over time, Congress has increased its regulatory power, but CFTC’s
authority to regulate doesn’t include certain financial derivatives. In 2000, Congress
passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which excludes identified
banking products, including covered swap agreements, from regulation by the CFTC.100
Kaza explains that the Act gives the CFTC authority for “diminishing,
eliminating, or preventing action defined as excessive speculation in any commodity
subject to the rules of contract markets or derivatives transaction execution facilities that
cause sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in price.”101 The
CFTC has the authority to exempt transactions such as spreads, arbitrage, or from fixing
limits to transactions or positions different from limits fixed for other transactions or
positions. The CFTC is required to consider the costs and benefits of any proposed
regulation. The costs and benefits are evaluated in terms of protection of market
participants and the public; the efficiency, competitiveness and financial integrity of
futures markets; price discovery; sound risk management practices; and other public
interest considerations.102 Congress also prevented the CFTC from exercising regulatory
authority on hybrid instruments. The CFTC is required to “consult with and seek the
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concurrence of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System concerning the
nature of the hybrid instrument before commencing a rulemaking or making a
determination about any identified banking product.103”
Approaches to Derivative Regulation
The following section will discuss three different approaches to regulation within
the derivatives market. The first approach is a framework of increased government
regulation that is focused on creating legislation that will prevent risks, increase internal
control measures, and increase corporate disclosures. The next approach calls for
deregulation and reliance on market forces to oversee the derivatives market. This
framework supports greater control for market participants in managing suitability, risk
capitalization, and internal risk management. The final approach discusses the need for
the private sector to oversee and regulate the derivatives market. This framework relies
on the role of private standard setting agencies that can manage risks by creating choice,
standardization, and stability. The reasons why this approach is more effective in the
OTC markets is described.
Argument for Greater Regulation
Regulation of financial markets protects public interest by protecting investors
and guarding against systemic risk. Stoll believes that “regulation is justified because it
protects investors who are uninformed and unskilled.”104 A second basis for financial
regulation is systemic risk. Systemic risk is “the risk of widespread default in any set of
financial contracts that can be linked to a default in derivatives.”105 This means that the
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failure of one financial institution will cause failures to other institutions and precipitate
system wide failure. Systemic risk is an externality because the system wide effects are
not costs for the firm that fails, and therefore have to be corrected by regulation.106
Regulation of derivatives is important because it prevents systemic risk with
minimal costs. Henstchel and Smith Jr. explain that “establishing effective public policy
requires an accurate assessment of not only the risks associated with derivatives, but also
the benefits offered by the instruments and the potential costs of regulatory
interference.”107 They believe that regulation is essential because the benefits are
substantial. These benefits exist because derivative markets have provided corporations
with financial tools that can be used to manage their exposure to financial prices and
risks. Henstchel and Smith Jr. support more productive regulatory laws that are “designed
to limit risks while preserving the efficiency of domestic and international capital
markets.”108 One regulatory initiative they propose is new and better disclosure
requirements; another is greater risk-based capital requirements.
Federal banking regulators also help reduce systemic risks in the markets. They
oversee all bank activities, including derivatives activities. A primary purpose of Federal
banking regulation is to ensure the safety and soundness of individual banks and the U.S.
financial system.109 Bank regulators are authorized to regulate affiliates of banks or bank
holding companies, regardless of the activities in which they are engaged. Bank
regulators rely on three primary means to oversee bank activities: reviewing required
reports; requiring adherence to minimum capital standards; and conducting periodic
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examinations to verify compliance with reporting, capital, and other regulatory
requirements.110 Banking regulation help protect the markets from risk.
Dealer risks and controls are an important area of derivatives for both dealers and
end-users. Federal banking agencies and the SEC have created programs to evaluate the
risk management systems of firms under their supervision. By testing and evaluating a
firm's risk management and controls system, regulators develop an understanding of the
firm's ability to control overall risk patterns in any given situation. Breeden believes that
“in the area of financial institutions' risk management systems; it is important for
regulators to establish standards for minimum practices, but not to codify a particular
form or approach.”111 Although large investment firms can create models to structure
their risk profiles, new market entrants, second or third tier dealers, and small companies
may have failed to make the investment in people, analytics and data systems required to
manage risk effectively. For derivatives dealers, a critical area is internal controls along
with their risk management system. In order to avoid scandals and financial losses,
regulators need to create better policies designed to control internal risk and to insure
compliance with the law.
The greatest need for improvement in risk management systems is with the endusers of derivatives, including corporations, government entities, mutual funds, pension
funds and other institutional investors. Breeden explains that this can be seen by many
companies that took losses when interest rates reversed their long decline because these
companies didn’t have adequate systems for understanding and managing risk.112 When a
small company decides to enter into derivatives trading that company enters a new area
110
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of managing its exposure. Such a company goes into the business of proprietary trading
and becomes a de facto dealer in derivative instruments.113 However, such a company
lacks the systems for risk modeling and control that would be present in a major dealer,
and does not have as many inputs of market information. Therefore, government
regulators need to closely monitor and have controls in place before making decisions
that affect the business in such risky ways.
The inadequacy of internal controls at many end-users of derivatives is another
problem. Many companies have invested in internal audit departments, and management
has devoted attention to the development and use of an effective and efficient system of
internal controls. However, there is much variation in the quality of these programs in
different companies. Board members are responsible to shareholders for protecting
against risk. Breeden suggests that effective internal control is accomplished through
internal action by the directors or senior management, and is tied to the individual
company's operating structure, and through proper legislation.114 Directors must be
certain that a company is able to control unacceptable risks of financial statement fraud,
and unethical or illegal business practices. Breenen believes that this is achieved by
companies setting high standards for management, established by informed and active
boards of directors, with government disclosure laws to shareholders and the market.”115
Disclosure should include the company's exposure and also its policies and practices
regarding risk management and internal controls
Improved transparency of parties for corporate disclosures on derivatives is
another area of improvement. The nature and level of a company's derivatives activity,
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and the exposure of both its earnings and net worth, are very important disclosure issues.
For firms with significant levels of exposure, management's discussion and analysis
should also include comments on the company's practices, controls and strategies.116 The
right legislation on disclosure will prevent losses to occur without previous disclosure
that such risks are happening.
Breenen states that “the growing importance and size of the OTC derivatives
market makes it vital for Congress to continue to regulate this marketplace.”117 The
market is global, and new types of transactions continue to evolve in derivatives. As a
result, regulation should be continuously updated to reflect changes in the market. One
area for concern is whether the SEC has done enough to allow shareholders and potential
investors to understand a corporation's derivatives exposure. The issue is whether
corporate net worth and earnings offers adequate disclosure. Greater legislation may help
prevent the development of abuses.
Argument for Greater Deregulation
The use of technology has accelerated the process of innovation and brought
about changes in financial markets and institutions that have challenged the effectiveness
of regulatory frameworks in place in many nations. According to D’arista “a lot of the
changes in financial structure and regulation that have taken place, have been driven by
market forces rather than shaped through the deliberative processes of law and
regulation.”118 The largest, most active and globally integrated markets are the OTC
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markets. Some researchers and economists support the deregulation of public agencies
and the rise of market forces in overseeing international markets.
Flannery supports this view and believes that government regulators should
minimize their role of regulatory oversight, and transfer more responsibility for financial
firms' governance to the market arrangements that control other types of public firms.119
Unlike the government, market forces could apply flexible and firm specific standards,
which would be more effective than regulation. Growth of the derivatives market has
shifted combination of government and private oversight. Government regulation tends to
be less flexible than market oversight, and flexibility is highly valued. The best approach
is “to rely more on market governance to monitor and control the risks of financial
failures.”120
Regulation restricts innovation and shifts valuable resources away from marketdriven risk management, because it is not driven by market forces. Culp and Mackay
believe that there is no “empirical support has been offered for the notion that current
regulation, with incremental improvements and enhanced coordination, is inadequate to
address the risks of derivatives.”121 They explain that over-regulating markets could be
costly because it might drive derivatives business overseas. Without government
agencies, the market is a powerful regulator of economic activity and can handle issues of
suitability, capitalization, and proper risk management.
One area that has a need for less regulation is suitability. Suitability relates to a
dealer’s responsibility for determining the extent to which its counterparty understands

119

Mark J Flannery, “Modernizing financial regulation: The relation between interbank transactions and
supervisory reform,” Journal of Financial Services Research 16.2 (1999): 102.
120
Flannery 102.
121
Culp and Mackay 1997.

Litvinova 35
the risks of the transactions into which it enters.122 A joint statement by the CFTC and the
SEC in the U.S., and the Securities and Investments Board (SIB) in the United Kingdom
suggests that dealers transacting with non-dealers should be required to obtain
information about customers to help ensure suitability. A majority of OTC derivatives
contracts are done between sophisticated counterparties that are capable of determining
appropriate contracts. Since these transactions create continuing credit exposures, which
last the duration of the transaction, participants have a strong incentive to ensure
counterparty suitability, even in the absence of regulation. Also, Culp and Mackay
believe that improved accounting and disclosure standards in the industry will make it
easier for institutions to evaluate suitability without the burden of costly regulations.123
Culp and Mackay suggest that “legislation imposing a suitability standard would
unnecessarily restrict derivatives users.”124 Smaller and less sophisticated end users
would find it more difficult to use derivatives to hedge their risk exposures. Increased
compliance costs will make some dealers avoid users who are complex and costly to
document. Less sophisticated institutions will be forced to use more expensive risk
management methods, creating costs for shareholder and creditors.
Another area of possible deregulation is risk capitalization. Adequate
capitalization is important for participation in the OTC market because of the creditintensive nature of derivatives. Participants that do not have good capitalization and high
credit risks will not be active in a competitive derivatives market. There is no need for
regulation because derivatives dealers have developed internal models for measuring and
allocating risk in order to maintain adequate capitalization. Culp and Mackay believe that
122
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regulation of capital adequacy can best be addressed by allowing institutions to use their
own risk management models for determining capital adequacy for credit and market
risks, subject to oversight by supervisors.125 This policy will promote innovation, safer
and sounder financial institutions, and more efficient allocation of capital.
Risk management practices are also an important aspect of derivative activities.
Shareholders, senior management, and outside auditors have strong incentives to ensure
adequate managerial oversight of risk-taking activities in order to protect and enhance the
profitability of their institutions. Management of major U.S. dealers has conducted
internal reviews of risk management procedures and practices. White believes that federal
regulations requiring a particular level of involvement by management in the oversight
process is difficult to implement and enforce.126 This is because each institution faces its
own unique risk exposures and has its own specific risk management processes and
internal controls. Regulation cannot substitute for effective management oversight.
The derivatives industry, through its individual members and trade associations,
has worked to promote information sharing and greater coordination amongst participants
in derivatives activities to address risks to the industry. As part of standard operating
procedures, market participants exchange information, coordinate examinations, and
create policies jointly. Additional coordination of domestic regulators is accomplished
through the Presidential Working Group and other policy groups. As a result, White
explains that regulation is not necessary because market participants police themselves.127
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Less restrictive regulatory changes have reinforced technological improvements
and have led to lower transaction costs for users entering these markets. Market
participants are better able to monitor derivative markets with efficient internal controls
and more flexible firm specific standards. Deregulation creates more incentives for firms
to be more aware of the risks that they undertake, promoting more surveillance of the
markets.
Argument for a Private Oversight Approach to Regulation
A successful regulatory approach needed to oversee the OTC derivative markets
should consider the benefits and risks that investors and market participants encounter.
However, for such an approach to work effectively for the derivatives market, the
benefits associated with implementing it must outweigh the risks. Based on previous
research, I believe that a private oversight approach to derivates will work most
effectively. Although, public regulation is important to monitor the national derivatives
market, the growth of derivatives on an international scale has limited the benefits of
such regulation. As a result, the private sector is more successful in maintaining order and
stability of derivative markets. Private oversight of derivatives markets has created
choice, standardization, minimization of counterparty risk, and stability. Along with these
benefits, there have also been costs associated with private regulation such as difficulty of
enforceability, and operational backlogs. Despite these risks, the advantages of the
private sector have had significant effects on international markets.
The private sector is highly needed because a vast and complex public regulatory
framework stifles innovation and progress. Matthews and Rusinko suggest that there does
not appear to be a strong demand for additional regulation of the OTC derivatives market

Litvinova 38
in the US.128 They believe that many of the problems that appear in the OTC derivatives
market can be solved through the analytical, problem-solving and private community that
produces and trades derivatives. The private sector has an active role in establishing
standards and guidance for OTC derivatives and risk management, and is more effective
than regulation. One problem with the regulatory approach is that “regulation by
government alone is less effective since government regulation is often slow to respond,
less informed than experts, and obtrusive.”129 This can be seen in the effectiveness of
rating agencies in dealing with credit risk. Rating agencies are independent entities and
quickly respond by reporting credit changes within institutions. However, government
agencies are more reluctant to report this information because they are directly involved.
Regulation also slows down innovation because flexibility is lost among market
participants. With the private sector overseeing the markets, flexibility and technological
growth is more supported and enhanced.
Complete deregulation also tends to be a less effective form of market regulation.
Lack of enforceability and sanctions is a disadvantage of relying on the market to police
changes in derivative markets. Without some form of oversight, the market will be unable
to deal with credit defaults and risks. As a result, the private sector is needed to help
avoid systemic risks and market failure, which might affect the whole derivative market.
Benefits of Private Oversight
As the growth of the OTC derivatives market has continued to proliferate, the
adaptation and innovation of the private regulatory sector has magnified. However, such
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growth has provided many benefits and costs to market participants involved in
derivatives markets.
One contribution of the private regulatory sector to the OTC market has been
choice. The growth of different regulatory agencies and private groups has enhanced
shareholder choice through enlarging the set of alternative regulatory practices available
to shareholders and by facilitating shareholders’ ability to make such choices. Investors
and financial firms have alternatives as to whether to be regulated by a federal regulator
or a private organization. The ability of firms to choose their regulator has created a
market for regulation.130
OTC transactions are not done on exchanges and are therefore not subject to
exchange rules by public regulatory bodies such as the SEC and the CFTC. This provides
a lot of freedom and flexibility for investors and end users who utilize OTC derivatives.
There are no capital requirements and participants have the flexibility to structure these
transactions in many different ways. This flexibility is important to private regulators
because they do not put heavy restrictions on OTC transactions. Instead, private
regulators have created a standardized structure for legal documentation of derivative
transactions. This standardization does not limit the types of contracts that can be made
and it doesn’t make rules for what kinds of transactions are acceptable. In contrast,
private regulation provides legal documentation to prevent against counterparty risk and
to provide a clear framework for entering into OTC transactions.
A large part of this contribution has been made by ISDA. The creation of a Master
Agreement and a set of definitions for derivative contracts have helped create
standardization. Parties that enter into OTC transactions know ahead of time the types of
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legal language and concepts they will include and negotiate on. As derivative innovations
have been introduced into the market, ISDA has been able to adapt and innovate as well.
The organization has made changes to confirmations and definitions to accommodate the
changing and growing market. An important benefit of standard documentation is that
disputes can be handled faster and more efficiently because of standards put in place on
contracts. Without ISDA documentation, creating binding contracts between
counterparties would be difficult. For example, two parties conduct an OTC credit default
swap without clearly stating legal terms in their contract. When one party defaults and is
unable to make payments to the other party, they may claim that they are not bound to a
contract and my terminate it. The other party has not benefited and has not received
payments. However, with the inclusion of ISDA’s Master Agreement and definitions, a
default of a party would be clearly explained and the contract would not be disputed.
The expansion of the OTC market has created a reliance on trade assignments
called novations. A novation is a cancellation of an existing derivative transaction and an
assignment of that transaction to a different party. This is beneficial for liquidity and
price discovery. However, many of these novations were being transferred to different
parties without consent. As a result, in 2005 ISDA published its Novation Protocol to
standardize the process of novations and to reduce their backlog.131 Under the protocol
the transferor must: (i) agree to a price with the transferee for a contemplated novation;
(ii) make a timely request for consent from the remaining party and provide sufficient
detail to identify the trade in question; (iii) ensure that the transferee receives a copy of
the remaining party's consent (if acquired); and (iv) remove the novated trade from its
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books132 (Raisler 11). ISDA’s protocol was able to create a standardized method for
handling disputes among market participants. This demonstrates the private regulators’
ability to resolve issues relating to changes and innovations of the OTC market.
The private regulatory sector aids in creating stability and integrity within the
OTC market. Private and independent credit-rating agencies play a significant role in
certifying the credit quality of potential market participants. Credit-rating agencies serve
as third-party monitors that provide public information about the credit worthiness of
counterparties. Just like public regulation of exchanges, rating agencies like S&P and
Moody’s provide transparency, auditing, and monitoring functions.133
Another contribution of private regulation is the Derivative Product Company that
helped eliminate counterparty risk for banks. To reduce the risks of entering long-term
contracts in the OTC market, parties emphasized high credit ratings. This special purpose
vehicle was set up by banks to achieve a high credit rating and allow banks with low
credit to participate in the derivative market. A DPC was able to achieve a triple-A rating
because its capital could not have been touched by creditors of the parent company if it
became bankrupt.134 The structure ensured that any counterparty risk for a participant
conducting trading was with the DPC and the risk with the end-user was with the DPC as
well. With the passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, special
purpose vehicles were significantly simplified and their legal costs were reduced.
Although, not as abundantly used today, DPC’s were an important structure for market
participants that wanted to become active in the OTC derivative market but did not have
high credit ratings.
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Private Sector Oversight
Benefits
Shareholder choice and alternatives
Flexibility and standardization by ISDA Master
Agreements
Stability and integrity through credit agencies

Risks
Difficulty of enforceability through confirmation
backlogs
Inability to prevent systemic risk
Formation of private organizations with
monopoly power

Reduction of counterparty risk through a DPC

Risks of Private Oversight
The complex and conflicting regulatory system has the potential to impede the
evolution of derivatives, especially the potential for economies of scale and scope to be
achieved. If regulation is not clear and concise then it will not be followed by
participants. Also, private regulation doesn’t hold as much weight as public regulation
that is enforced more rigorously. Unless private regulation becomes a standard used by
the industry, like ISDA documentation, it will have a hard time being imposed.
One example of the difficulty of enforceability of private regulation can be seen
in the ISDA confirmations backlog. With the growth of the OTC market using ISDA
confirmations to record and legally bind parties to contracts, there has been a large
amount of outstandings. When a trade is done over-the-counter a confirmation is issued
by one of the parties, usually a broker/dealer. In T+3 days both parties need to sign the
confirmation to legalize the trade. However, with the large volume of trading, double
signed confirmations have taken greater than T+30 days to approve. This creates risk for
counterparties because if a credit event happens within that time and the confirmation is
not signed, one party may claim that they are not legally bound by the contract. In 2005,
in an effort reduce such risks the Federal Reserve conducted meetings with 14 primary
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dealers to set targets to reduce outstanding confirmations. The goal was to reduce
outstanding greater than 30 days by certain targets at appropriate deadlines.
One solution proposed for the industry to maintain progress towards backlog was
a greater reliance on post-trade automation. The Depository Trust and Clearing
Corporation (DTCC) was developed to help investors and fund managers with derivatives
matching and confirmation service. DTCC uses an electronic matching platform called
Deriv/SERV to match confirms and trades to reduce operational risk associated with
manual processing.135 This service allows confirmations to be processed within T+3 days
and is more efficient than a manual process. Greater reliance on DTCC among
broker/dealers and investors would reduce confirmation backlogs as well as risks.
Another aspect that can create risks within the private sector is a monopoly of
standard setting organizations. Although ISDA’s standard form derivatives
documentation can be cost reducing, the organization can create a monopoly on the
creation of legal rules. According to Partnoy, “one explanation for ISDA’s dominance is
that ISDA is simply more efficient than other rule providers, and that the economies of
providing standard form contracts naturally will lead to single provider.”136 Another
reason is that since ISDA was the first organization to get involved with documentation
of derivatives, it has created a barrier to entry for any competing providers. A third
possibility is that a few dealer members of ISDA are exercising market power in creating
legal rules. However, there might also be cause for concern if ISDA continues to be the
sole provider of legal rules for derivatives contracts. One reason might be because a few
major dealers control the production of legal rules, and the form agreements they use are
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written to benefit dealers in dealer-to-dealer contracts, or are constructed to advantage
dealers in dealer-to-end-user contracts.137 The leadership of ISDA is dominated by a
small number of major dealers. In contrast, end-users of derivatives are much more
numerous, and therefore face collective action problems in creating a plausible set of
alternative legal rules. End-users are not entitled to vote on ISDA decisions, and do not
have any role in formulating legal rules. However, even given ISDA’s domination,
individual dealers have incentives to compete for derivatives business, and if end-users
value particular contract provisions, individual dealers can capture business by amending
their forms.138 If the legal rules were fixed and non-negotiable, dealers and end-users still
could negotiate based on price. The trend to privatizing legal rules in the derivatives
industry is likely to continue, and ISDA is likely to be the dominant provider of legal
rules
As financial markets continue to go global, attempts to impose a single regulatory
framework are likely to fail. Institutional regulation along with competition among
different legal jurisdictions around the world will continue to expand. The task for
regulators is not to form one massive world-wide regulatory approach but rather to enter
into agreements under which regulation by private regulators will be acceptable.139 The
regulatory system should broad based with greater emphasis on the private sector and the
deregulation of government oversight. The private regulation is able to quickly and
effectively respond to changes in the market and it allows innovation to prosper among
OTC derivatives.
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Conclusion
Derivative markets have grown tremendously over the past several years and
continue to evolve and innovate. The global market for OTC derivatives amounted to
$111 trillion in December 2001 up from $72 trillion in June 1998140. The increase
represents an average yearly rise of 11.4 percent. In order to maintain this growth and to
create stability within the markets, proper regulatory approaches need to be implemented.
Economists and researchers have proposed several types of frameworks that they believe
will be effective in monitoring the derivatives markets. This paper suggested three
possible approaches: greater public regulation, deregulation and reliance on market
forces, and reliance on the private sector to regulate the markets. I believe that the most
effective regulatory approach to derivative markets is private sector oversight. The
private sector is efficient in quickly responding to changes and innovations within the
market and is able to create stability and standardization through its various agencies. The
benefits described above suggest that private regulation is capable of aiding the growth
and evolution of the OTC markets into the future. The growth of the private sector in
derivatives regulation is likely to continue because of the wide acceptance and use of
industry standard organizations and policy groups, which have added liquidity and
standardization to the market.
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